Space & Astronomy/Space and Astronomy (October 1993).iso/mac/TEXT/SPACEDIG/V12_5/V12_572.TXT

Internet Message Format | 1991-06-28 | 16KB

Return-path: <[e-mail]>
X-Andrew-Authenticated-as: 7997;andrew.cmu.edu;Ted Anderson
Received: from beak.andrew.cmu.edu via trymail for +dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/[e-mail] (->+dist+/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr11/tm2b/space/space.dl) (->ota+space.digests)
          ID </afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr1/ota/Mailbox/0bFXqZC00VcJMDTE4T>;
          Sun, 18 Nov 1990 02:52:05 -0500 (EST)
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Precedence: junk
Reply-To: [e-mail]
From: [e-mail]
To: [e-mail]
Date: Sun, 18 Nov 1990 02:51:32 -0500 (EST)
Subject: SPACE Digest V12 #572

SPACE Digest                                     Volume 12 : Issue 572

Today's Topics:
              Re: Save our Shuttle data?
               USA 38 Payload Observed
   Summary of responses to "the Ariane V36 failure" (long - sorry)
             Re: LNLL Inflatable Stations
        Re: Reliability and Insurance (3 of 3)
          NASA Prediction Bulletins:  Space Shuttle

Administrivia:

    Submissions to the SPACE Digest/sci.space should be mailed to
  [e-mail].  Other mail, esp. [un]subscription notices,
  should be sent to [e-mail], or, if urgent, to
             [e-mail]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 17 Nov 90 02:11:30 GMT
From: usc!wuarchive!emory!wa4mei!ke4zv![e-mail]  (Gary Coffman)
Subject: Re: Save our Shuttle data?

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Doug Mohney) writes:
>What steps could be (are?) taken to preserve the specs and construction
>techniques for the Space Shuttle, especially in the area of the main engines?
>
>There's been a lot of speculation on what it would take to (re) build a 1990
>Apollo command module or a Saturn V, and the typical answer seems to be "You
>can't; they burned/lost/destroyed/buried the plans."
>
>I could see us sitting around 15 years from now going "Gosh, the Shuttle SSME,
>with a few minor differences, would be a perfect application." Are the plans
>and specs to SSMEs proprietary? Or are they the property of the U.S.
>government?
>
>We've "lost" one set of technological plans (Apollo/Saturn) already. Some will
>argue we should be glad to lose the Shuttle whenever it is finally retired, but
>I'd rather see all the data stashed away somewhere gathering dust than
>"lost."
>
>Maybe we need Leonard Nimoy to do a "In Search of" the Saturn V specifications.
>Are all the engineers who worked on building and designing the F-1 engines
>dead?

We still have the design specs of the F-1 engines. Heck, we even have real
live examples lying around. So what's the problem? The problem is that
many of the parts required special job shop techniques to machine the
materials to the right tolerances and special heat treatments were required
for some of the materials. Machining special alloys to precise tolerances
requires special techniques that are often specfic to the particular machine
tool used. Sometimes to the very tool and not just any production model of
the tool. The machine operator plays a very major part in this operation.
It's his skill, experience, and most particularly, his "feel" for his
machine that determines the results. Unlike a production line, job shop
machining almost always uses hand controlled machines. Most of the work
for Saturn was done by small job shops under subcontract. Many of these
are out of business. Many of the machine tools used have been consigned
to the scrap heap as worn out or have changed hands at bankruptcy auctions.
Most of the experienced machinists who developed the often undocumented
tricks that made the machining work have long since retired or died.
Some of the specialty metals suppliers who supplied the job shops with
exotic alloys are either out of business or don't make those alloys
anymore.

It's not so much that the plans have been lost or destroyed, it's that
the infrastructures needed to execute the plans have been lost. This
is true in many areas of technology. A friend of mine who runs a job
shop remarked that he had almost never seen a set of specs and procedures
come down from the contractor that would actually work. He said every
job requires special tricks devised on the shop floor to actually
produce an item that meets engineering specs. These tricks are almost
always only documented in the individual machine operator's head and
hands. Often the operator can't say exactly what it is that he is doing
that makes a process work. It's programmed at the reflex level. This
is the major reason we can't make Saturns anymore without a major new
development program where a whole new generation of job shops relearn
the tricks their machines and their batches of special alloys require
to produce the parts.

Gary

------------------------------

Date: 17 Nov 90 04:21:37 GMT
From: van-bc!ubc-cs!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!utgpu![e-mail]  (Ted Molczan)
Subject: USA 38 Payload Observed

I have received reports of STS 38 payload sightings tonight by two
observers, working independently on consecutive shuttle passes over the
southern U.S.A..

The first sighting, by a Tampa Florida area observer who prefers to
remain anonymous, was at about 18:46 EST (16 Nov 23:46 UTC).  The shuttle
was preceded by 24.1 seconds by a reddish/yellow, magnitude zero satellite.
The observer reported a rapid variation in brightness, from reddish to
golden to yellow-white.  This could be an indication of a rapid spin.  The
spacecraft passed at a 76 deg elevation to the north.

The second sighting was by Mike McCants, of Austin Texas, at 19:15 CST
(17 Nov 01:15 UTC).  Mike was observing under very poor sky conditions, but
did see the spacecraft for about 10 seconds through a hole in the clouds.
When the first object came by, he thought it was the shuttle, though
somewhat faint.  Then, the shuttle came by, he realized that the first
object had been the payload.

The brightness and colour of the payload are reminiscent of the Lacrosse
radar imaging sat, deployed from Atlantis on STS 27, however it is too
soon to make even a tentative identification.  Further observations are
required.

So far, the AV WEEK story on this mission has been very accurate.

--
Ted [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date: 17 Nov 90 17:37:09 GMT
From: eagle![e-mail]  (Ronald E. Graham)
Subject: Summary of responses to "the Ariane V36 failure" (long - sorry)

This is a summary of responses to the thread entitled "the Ariane V36
failure."  I am grateful to all of the participants in the discussion.
Contributors were:

Peter Budgell           [e-mail]
Henry Spencer           [e-mail]
Bruce Dunn              [e-mail]
Michael Mraz            [e-mail]
Jean-Yves Herve'        [e-mail]
George William Herbert  [e-mail]

The original article read:

[regarding the failure of the Ariane V36...]

> I hope someone can offer insight on the following questions:
>
> (1) the failure was due to a piece of cloth.  How could this have been
>     isolated after the failure?
> (2) what is the mechanism by which a piece of cloth was able to cause the
>     failure?  By that I mean
>     - was the cloth of sufficient size/porosity to totally restrict water
>       flow?  or did it have to be?
>     - how is a piece of cloth able to be in the water line anyway?
>     - what is the sequence of events leading to the failure, given the
>       presence of the cloth?
> (3) how can Arianespace ensure no repeat of this mechanism/sequence of
>     events?

Per Mr. Spencer and Mr. Dunn, a summary of the sequence of events leading
to the failure would be:

o    the water line to one of the main engines is blocked;
o    chamber pressure drops to that engine;
o    the engine loses thrust;
o    remaining engines gimbal to correct for thrust imbalance;
o    remaining engines go hard-over, but vehicle goes off course anyway;
o    vehicle skids into yaw motion;
o    vehicle breaks up due to aerodynamic loads.

Now, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Mraz all asked the same question: "what
was a water line doing in the propulsion system anyway?"  Mr. Herbert said
he thought it was for cooling engine parts, but Mr. Spencer disagreed.  I
have contacted a couple of folks in my area who are Atlas wizards, and they
did not recognize any comparable water-lines as part of an Atlas.  I am
still looking into it, however, and will report as soon as I learn something.
Atlas uses different engines than the Ariane series, but there's more to it
than that, I'm sure.

One similarity between the V36 and the average Atlas: an Atlas can only
hard-over its engines about 4 degrees, and can only handle yaw motion up
to that point.  The Ariane series is in the same situation.

Mr. Dunn references the journal Spaceflight, regarding the determination
of the cause of the failure:

[The article goes on to talk about how debris from the exploded launcher
fell at the shoreline and just off-shore of the launch site.]  "In particular,
this search located external tubing of engine D as well as water tank
elements.  The first stage propulsion bay along with the four Viking motors
was found.  Despite extremely difficult conditions, the suspect elements
of the water circuit were recovered shortly before this issue of Spaceflight
went to press..."

"The rag was probably left in the pipe when the tubing was dismantled and
readjusted during first stage integration before transfer to French Guiana.
Arianespace Chairman Frederic d'Allest said the cause of the failure was
'not only shocking but hard to accept.'"

Mr. Herve' points out that the cloth was found "clean," indicating that it
had probably not been used for cleaning and forgotten.  So how did it get
there, then?  Anybody care to comment?

Regarding quality control, and ensuring against a repeat failure: Mr. Dunn
again references Spaceflight,

"From flight V37, the water line and the N2O4 feed line of each engine will
be examined.  The inspection will take place at Kourou (launch site in Fr.
Guiana), using a fibroscope type video camera with integrated light source.
Additional leak checks were made on the first stage and strap-on fuel lines
to ensure that there was no repeat of the fire on the previous mission.
Also, new thermal protection inside the propulsion bays of the first stage
will protect electrical systems in the event of a fire."

Mr. Budgell notes a parallel between this situation and Nuclear power
station startups: "all kinds of strange things are said to come out
of the piping during commisioning - soft drink cans, welder's dams,
2 x 4's ..."

"During commisioning (of a nuclear power station) they will put screens
in strategic locations, let water into the piping, and test the pumps.
The screens are to prevent debris from entering reactors, heat exchanger
tubing, impellers, and so on.  The screens will be checked after
pump tests.  Tool counts, like the QC procedures in operating rooms,
attempt to prevent things being left behind."

Mr. Spencer notes that no single organization was responsible for the
entire water line.  Management confusion can get in the way both of
resolving present failures and of preventing new ones.

Two final notes:

o    Mr. Dunn comments, "Spaceflight is an excellent journal received
     by members of the British Interplanetary Society."  The address is

          27/29 South Lambeth Road, London, SW8 1SZ, England

o    one other response flamed NASA for my attitude, presented in the way
     I asked for responses to these questions.  While I wish I had a
     nickel for every time somebody flames NASA ;-), I learn a valuable
     lesson: the next time you want thoughtful comments only, ask for
     them: "thoughtful comments only, please."

RG

------------------------------

Date: 15 Nov 90 00:26:39 GMT
From: agate!dog.ee.lbl.gov!hellgate.utah.edu!caen!umich!sharkey!cfctech!teemc!fmeed1![e-mail]  (Russ Cage)
Subject: Re: LNLL Inflatable Stations

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Charles Radley) writes:
>That is not the point.   Any material can carry any load, if it has big
>enough cross section.   It is a question of how heavy it has to be to get low
>enough stress.     Structure carrying centrifugal loads is heavier than
>structure which does not.

Charles, you could easily check this yourself.  If the rotating mass
is 80,000 lbs/half, and it averages 1/2 G, then the total tension is
40,000 lbs.  If the diameter is 15 feet, then the internal 7.5 psi
pressure exerts a tension of 190,000 lbs, nearly 5 times the load
from centrifugal effects.

What really appalls me is that you had similar numbers available
to you from the net, and failed to find your incorrect assertion
before posting.  I hoped for better from you.

>  Why exactly do LLNL want to spin the thing anyway ?  I cannot see any
>advantage where crews are rotated every 90 days.  And half the fun for the
>astronauts is the zero-gee....

Blinders on again...  Charles, this could easily be another of
those cost-saving measures.  Crews do not *have* to be rotated
every 90 days, which reduces transport (and thus life-cycle) costs.
You keep assuming the weaknesses of NASA's design when talking
about LLNL's design.  This is fallacious thinking.
--
Russ Cage    Ford Powertrain Engineering Development Department
Work:  itivax.iti.org!cfctech!fmeed1!cage   (CHATTY MAIL NOT ANSWERED HERE)
Home:  [e-mail]  (All non-business mail)
Member:  HASA, "S" division.

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 17 Nov 90 09:38:06 -0500
From: "Allen W. Sherzer" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: Reliability and Insurance (3 of 3)
Newsgroups: sci.space
Cc:

In article <[e-mail]> Henry Spencer writes:
>>I know Rockwell was considering a Commercial Shuttle a while back...

>The big problem that has hit all attempts at commercializing the shuttle
>is NASA, which does not want to lose control of the program....

True, but a good case for it could be made under Title II of the current NASA
authorization bill. Of course, Rockwell would need to push for it in
a very agressive manner but it could be done.

The big problem is that none of the aerospace contractors want to piss
off NASA.

  Allen
--
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Allen W. Sherzer| I had a guaranteed military sale with ED-209. Renovation |
|   [e-mail]  | programs, spare parts for 25 years. Who cares if it      |
|                | works or not?  - Dick Jones, VP OCP Security Concepts    |

------------------------------

Date: 17 Nov 90 20:13:36 GMT
From: ncis.tis.llnl.gov!blackbird![e-mail]  (TS Kelso)
Subject: NASA Prediction Bulletins:  Space Shuttle


The most current orbital elements from the NASA Prediction Bulletins are
carried on the Celestial RCP/M, [phone], and are updated several times
weekly.  Documentation and tracking software are also available on this
system.  As a service to the satellite user community, the most current
elements for the current shuttle mission are provided below.  The Celestial
RCP/M may be accessed 24 hours/day at 300, 1200, or 2400 baud using 8 data
bits, 1 stop bit, no parity.

STS 38
1 20935U 90 97  A 90320.40850694  .00161290  68898-5  25599-3 0    47
2 20935  28.4646 240.6373 0006560 286.7334  43.3613 16.02355418    67
--
Dr TS Kelso                           Assistant Professor of Space Operations
[e-mail]          Air Force Institute of Technology

------------------------------

End of SPACE Digest V12 #572
*******************